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The Discursive Ethics of
Jack Sammons
by David T. Ritchie*
I.
Professor Jack Sammons has been a widely celebrated teacher,
community activist, and distinguished member of the bar. He is also a
prolific scholar; perhaps the most prolific scholar the Mercer University
School of Law has ever seen. My interest in the body of Jack's work,
and hence my focus here, is on what I consider to be the core of his
scholarly agenda. I would like to caution that this is my reading of
Jack's work as a corpus. I am not entirely sure that Jack would agree
with this reading (especially later on when I will make some connections
to philosophical positions I am not sure he would necessarily endorse),
but I hope this will be perceived as a friendly interpretation. It is
certainly meant in that vein.
How would we characterize the corpus of Jack Sammons' work? What
kind of scholar is he? Is he a philosopher of religion? Is he a legal
theorist? Is he a rhetorician? He is all of these things and more, of
course. I will not focus on any of these domains in what follows,
however. Instead, I want to make the claim that Jack is at base an
ethicist. The one patent theme I see running throughout his work is his
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concern with moral judgment. More specifically, his is a concern about
the ethical engagement of those embedded in discursive communities:
art, law, philosophy, politics, and religion. Jack has written about all
these areas, of course, but the common thread-on my reading-is ethics.
Virtually all of his work relates to moral reasoning by those operating
within one or more of these communities. To borrow a phrase from our
mutual friend Linda Berger, Jack's scholarly work is ethics "all the way

down."1

II.
On its face, the claim that Jack Sammons is an ethicist might seem
somewhat obvious to those who know Jack and his scholarship. He has,
after all, taught legal ethics and professional responsibility for years.2
Jack is, indeed, considered an expert in that field by many.3 I want to
go somewhat further, though. My claim here is that all of his interests
and works-whether they are focused on poetry4 or music,5 history6 or
politics,7 language' or Samba 9 (which, it turns out, is about all of the
abovel°)-can be viewed as coalescing on a robust and sophisticated
normative ethical theory.

1. Linda Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric".A Place to Stand, 16 J.
LEGAL WRITING INsT. 3, 6 n.9 (2010). Professor Berger, in turn, borrows this phrase from
Dean Francis Mootz. Francis J. Mootz mH, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practiceand
Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491, 572 (1998).
2. Jack also wrote a very early and influential book on lawyer professionalism. See
JACK L. SAMMONS, JR., LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988).
3. Timothy W. Floyd, The Relationship Between Christian Theology and Legal Ethics
in the Thought ofJack Sammons, 66 MERCER L. REV. 313 (2015); Patrick Emery Longan,
FurtherReflections on Teaching Professionalism:A Thank You Note to Jack Sammons, 66
MERCER L. REV. 513 (2015).
4. See Jack L. Sammons, On Teachingthe Legality of Televising CapitalPunishments,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139 (1992) thereinafter Sammons, Televising CapitalPunishments].
5. See Jack L. Sammons, The Law's Melody, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1143 (2010).
6. See H. Russell Cort & Jack L. Sammons, The Search for 'Good Lawyering": Some
Approaches to Resolving an HistoricalDebate, 1 ANTIOCH L.J. 7 (1981).
7. See J. Owens Smith & Jack L. Sammons, Public Rights in Georgia's Tidelands, 9
GA. L. REV. 79 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Jack L. Sammons, Legal Writing Scholarship,Making Strange, and the
Aesthetics of Legal Rhetoric, 61 MERCER L. REV. 925 (2010) [hereinafter Sammons, Legal
Writing Scholarship].
9. See Jack L. Sammons, Censoring Samba: An Aesthetic Justification for the
Protection of Speech, 37 STETSON L. REV. 855 (2008) [hereinafter Sammons, Censoring
Samba].
10. See id.
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So what sort of ethicist is he? My initial impulse was to assume that
his long-standing interests in Aristotelianism" and the work of the
contemporary moral and political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre12
would lead him to virtue ethics. If we look at his ethical views, however,
it turns out that this assumption is not completely borne out. Jack is
certainly influenced by the work of both Aristotle and MacIntyre, but he
is not a virtue ethicist of either the Aristotelian or MacIntyreian stripe.
He certainly employs virtue ethics at times, but he recognizes the
weaknesses in that position and is not constrained by those weaknesses.
He is not doctrinaire. 13
I next expected to see some alignment with the moral intuitionism of
Jack's friend and mentor, Robert Audi.14 While there are some echoes
of this position in Jack's work, he is decidedly not a moral intuitionist.' 5 This is perhaps driven by Robert's preoccupation with the
relationship between epistemology and meta-ethics. 6
This is a
fascination that he does not seem to share with Robert. Jack certainly
has interesting things to say about this-and to see him and Robert
discuss this is a joy to watch-but his work is not primarily in this genre.
Jack is focused on far more practical concerns.
This last point might lead us to conclude that Jack is a practical
ethicist. Practical ethics is sometimes referred to as applied ethics. 7
But practical ethics is not a normative ethical theory, however."8 It is,
instead, a grouping of a variety of ethical theories that are applied to
particular areas of human concern: law, medicine, business, etc. 9 In
that sense, Jack's work-particularly his work on legal ethics-would fall
under the umbrella of practical ethics. But this does not tell us the

11. THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (JA.K. Thomson trans.,
1953).
12. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE: A STuDY IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed.
2007).
13. One could almost say that he is pragmatic in his utilization of virtue ethics.
14. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND
INTRINSIC VALUE (2004).
15. He perhaps comes closest to the views Audi put forth here: Robert Audi, Moderate

Intuitionismand the Epistemology of MoralJudgment, 1 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC.
15 (1998).
16. A good resource on Audi's work in this vein is

RATIONALITY AND THE GOOD:

CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF ROBERT AUDI (Mark Timmons et

al. eds., 2007).
17. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 44 (Ted Honderiched. ed., 2d ed.
2005).
18. See id. An alternative view can be found in PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (3d
ed. 2011).
19.

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17.
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normative philosophical framework Jack typically employs in his ethical
work. In other words, while his scholarly work on the whole can fairly
be characterized as practical or applied ethics, this does not capture the
normative perspective driving Jack's positions.
We need to find, then, a better and more precise characterization of
Jack's ethical theory. On my reading, Jack can best be classified as a
discourse ethicist.2 ° Briefly stated, discourse ethics is the theory that
normative value is determined by the nature of discursive practices 2 '
within a community. It is the embeddedness of actors within a
rhetorical or (as I prefer) discursive community, and the intersubjectivity
of those so embedded, that both determines normative meaning and
evaluation.2 Moral judgments, in effect, are based on norms determined by the discursive practices of actors in particular social contexts. 23 It is important to note that this is not a theory that is primarily concerned with the ethical rules we ought to observe during communicative actions.24 Instead, discourse ethicists are interested in how
moral judgment is related to, derived from, and gives expression to
situated discursive communities.25
Discourse ethics is, of course, related to discourse theory; principally
that found in continental philosophy. 2' Discourse theorists analyze the
way in which language helps to order how we think about and understand the world. For our purposes here, it's enough to mention that
discourse theorists concern themselves with the relationship of humans
to their linguistic communities. These communities are reconstituted
through the socialization of their members. As the German social,
political, and legal theorist JUrgen Habermas puts it: "[Tihe lifeworld
reproduces itself to the extent that [ three functions, which transcend
the perspectives of the actors, are fulfilled: the propagation of cultural

20. See KARL-OTTO APEL, THE RESPONSE OF DISCOURSE ETHICS TO THE MORAL
CHALLENGE OF THE HUMAN SITUATION AS SUCH AND ESPECIALLY TODAY (2001); see also
RICARDO BLAUG, DEMOCRACY, REAL AND IDEAL: DISCOURSE ETHICS AND RADICAL POLITICS
(1999).
21. Discursive Practice is a theory of the linguistic and socio-cultural characteristics of
recurring episodes of face-to-face interaction-episodes that have social and cultural
significance to a community of speakers. See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE:
STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).

22. JURGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43-115 (Christian

Lenhardt & Sherry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
23. Id.
24. APEL, supra note 20, at 39-49.
25.

Id.

26. A good introduction to this is JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE
OF MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987).
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traditions, the integration of groups by norms and values, and the
socialization of succeeding generations."27 Discourse theory is not just
about linguistics, then; it gets to the very fabric of social organization.
Discourse ethics is an expression of how the interactions amongst and
between members of particular discursive communities ought to be
handled. Generally speaking, discourse ethicists attempt to define and
modulate the manner in which participants within a discursive
community may carry out their interactions.2" In an important way,
there are certain preconditions to the formation of discursive communities. Once formed, the continued existence and evolution of these
communities depends on the sustained recognition of a set of norms and
practices that enable communicative action to carry meaningful content
as well as resolve disputes or misunderstandings. Ethical action is
action that recognizes and comports to these norms and practices. These
sorts of relationships happen in all types of discursive communities:
linguistic, political, professional, religious, etc.
To give you an example of what I mean, you might imagine how the
participants in a political community agree upon the rhetorical practices
that can be employed during conversation about public issues and
events.' The actors in this community will also typically determine
social parameters (and often cultural and professional parameters as
well) to participation and so on.30 Those practices, or norms, are then
used to evaluate the tenor and content of public discourse.3 ' Those who
fail to adhere to these norms in their discursive practices are judged to
be failing in their3 2obligations as members of the community; they are
acting immorally.

A more concrete example would be the manner in which members of
a profession carry out their business. Lawyers, for instance, have a
complex set of norms and practices that guide and constrain their
actions. Ethical action within the discourse community of the law
demands that these norms and practices are observed and followed.
Further, actors within this domain will (or should) incorporate these
norms and practices into their identity. In fact, discourse theorists go
so far as to say that actors within the domain of the law will see the
world, and make sense of what they see, by employing the norms and

Id. at 299.
See generally APEL, supra note 20;
See BLAUG, supra note 20.
Id.
31. HABERMAS, supra note 22.
32. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

HABERMAS,

supra note 22.
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practices they have integrated in this way. In a very real way, they live
these norms and practices; they are constitutive.
Jurgen Habermas is perhaps the most famous and notable discourse
Habermas, and fellow German Karl-Otto Apel' (who is
ethicist."
credited with coining the term discourse ethics3 5 ), developed competing
frameworks by which normative judgments should be made by those
Habermas bases his
embedded within discursive communities.36
framework on Kantian deontology;37 Apel bases his largely on pragmatism3" (primarily the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce39 ). Jack
does not use either of these frameworks directly, although I am sure he
employs elements of both in places. He is somewhat pragmatic in his
use of a variety of ethics frameworks. His discourse ethics is similar to
another normative ethical perspective, however, one that I will discuss
below in more detail. Suffice it to say that Jack's ethical position on
discourse and communicative action is decidedly different than that
offered by either Habermas or Apel. Arguably, then, Jack Sammons
offers a unique and competing discourse ethics; but in my mind discourse
ethics it is!
III.
Let me turn now to making out the claim that Jack Sammons is a
discourse ethicist. When we look at Jack's works we see a startling-perhaps I should say prolific-array of topics represented. For
example, he has written about issues as diverse as art,4" clinical
education,4 ' linguistics, 4 2 music," play," poetry," politics, 46 rheto-

33.
34.
35.

Id.

See

APEL, supra note 20.
Matthias Kettner, Discourse Ethics: Apel, Habermas,and Beyond, in BIoETHICS IN

CULTURAL CONTEXT: REFLECTIONS ON METHODS AND FINITUDE 299 (C. Rehmann-Sutter et

al. eds., 2006).
36. Id.
37. See Jurgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant
Apply to Discourse Ethics? 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38 (1989).
38. See Tibor Goossens, The Foundation of Morals in Apers Discourse Ethics
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http:/www.tiborgoossens.nl/Documents/Foundation
%20of%20Morals%20in%2OApel's%20Discourse%2OEthics.pdf (last accessed Nov.12, 2014).
39. See generally KARL-OTTO APEL, CHARLES S. PEIRCE: FROM PRAGMATISM TO
PRAGMATICISM (John Michael Krois trans., 1981).
40. See Jack L. Sammons, Can Law Be Art?, 66 MERCER L. REV. 527 (2015).
41. Sammons, Televising CapitalPunishments,supra note 4; Sammons, Legal Writing
Scholarship, supra note 8; see also Jack L. Sammons, Traditionalists,Technicians,and
Legal Education, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 237 (2003).
42. See Jack L. Sammons, The Impossible Prayersof James Boyd White, in LIVING IN
A LAW TRANSFORMED: ENCOUNTERS WITH THE WORKS OF JAMES BOYD WHITE (Julen Etxabe
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ric, 47

and yes, even samba."w When we look at these works, though,
we see that his true concern is with the discursive, professional, and
social practices of actors within each of these domains. What are the
standards we find within conversations in these domains? What do
these norms tell us about producing art, educating practitioners, writing
poetry, and so on? And correspondingly, what does the carrying on of
these activities tell us about ourselves-individually and collectively?
What can we derive ontologically from the various norms and practices
that undergird various discursive communities?
When we look at Jack's published writings it becomes apparent that
he has developed-over the last two decades-a robust notion of how
discursive practices shape and influence our ethical decision-making, and
in turn how moral judgment forms (or reconstitutes) the norms and
practices within these domains.4 9 In a piece about the Nazi Albert
Speer,5 ° for example, Jack tells us that Speer's moral failings were
directly traceable to his abandonment of an overlapping set of discursive
norms found in a variety of social and professional roles which Speer
occupied simultaneously (architect, father, German, Christian, etc.).5"
His most important failure, however, was that he did not practice his
primary professional role-that of architect-in a sufficiently discursive
and ethical way. Jack says,
The public-private conversation Speer could have as an architect could
place him in a community outside this "society of totally isolated
individuals" in which he could only see himself. By doing so, it could
give him a moral distance from Hitler, and the skills he needed to spell
out his full engagement with the world.52

& Gary Watts eds., 2014).
43. Sammons, The Law's Melody, supra note 5.
44. See Jack L. Sammons, Justice as Play, 61 MERCER L. REV. 517 (2010).
45. Sammons, Televising Capital Punishments,supra note 4.
46. Jack L. Sammons, Some Concluding Reflections-Recovering the Political: The
Problem with Our Political Conversations, 63 MERCER L. REv. 899 (2012) [hereinafter
Sammons, Some ConcludingReflections].
47. Sammons, Legal Writing Scholarship, supra note 8.
48. Sammons, Censoring Samba, supra note 9.
49. See, e.g., Jack L. Sammons, Jr. & Linda H. Edwards, Honoring the Law in
Communities of Force: Terrell and Wildman's Teleology of Practice, 41 EMoRY L.J. 489

(1992).
50. Jack L. Sammons, Jr., Rebellious Ethics and Albert Speer, in AGAINST THE GRAIN:
NEw APPROACHES TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Michael Goldberg ed., 2001).

51. Id. at 126-27.
52. Id. at 130.
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Because he did not fully engage the embedded norms and practices of his
professional identity, Speer was unable to act ethically in any of the
overlapping discursive communities of which he was a part.53
In a short piece Jack wrote for me when I was editing a monthly
column in a now defunct publication on professional communication-which he entitled The Lawyer's Moral Obligation to Write
Well 54-Jack maintained that authentic engagement in the discursive
practices shared by members of the legal community (and by extension
the shared human experience) is "the" path to ethical action.55
Drawing on the work of Professor James Boyd White, he says there:
[Tihe language of the law is used well when it is used honestly to
persuade another person, when the identification between writer and
reader that persuasion seeks is an accomplishment of the conversation
itself rather than a recognition of a shared identity formed prior to it,
and when the language is, in James Boyd White's term, the "living
speech" of a fully human person, a real self at work behind the
words.56
The manner in which we carry out the conversations that constitutes our
"selves" is, in an important way, the very definition of ethical engagement.5 7 This comes across most clearly in the conclusion of his essay
58 when he says, "When we
The Radical Ethics of Legal Rhetoricians
return our ethical thinking to context, as we must, when we take
seriously who we are and what we do, we must inevitably return to the
ethics of the practices that constitute our lives."59 This 6is0 precisely the
sort of embeddedness that discourse ethics presupposes.
This discursive engagement in ethical practice is not just a manner of
being in any particular moment, but is a shared project within the
community of engagement.6 1 Similar to (but much more comprehensive, and therefore more profound, than) Ronald Dworkin's serial

53.

Id. at 142-43.

54. Jack L. Sammons, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation to Write Well, THE COMPLETE
(Feb. 2, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1336542.
Id.

LAWYER

55.

56. Id.
57. Sammons, Justice as Play, supra note 44.
58. Jack L. Sammons, The RadicalEthics of Legal Rhetoricians,32 VAL. U. L. REv. 93
(1997).
59. Id. at 103.
60. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRISUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 222-37 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
61. Id.
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authorship notion,62 Jack suggests that we are always already engaged
in a continual and shifting writing and rewriting of norms in situ and
on the fly. 6 3 Recognizing this, and negotiating our role in these ongoing
narratives of discursive engagement, is to act ethically."
I could go on to discuss how all this fits into Jack's interests in
continental and postmodern philosophy, hermeneutics, rhetoric, and all
the rest of it. But the careful reader has probably already started to
realize the many connections in what I have said thus far. What
appears, on the surface, as a widely diverse set of interests (and it is
surely that at some level), begins to shape into a coherent-and tightly
wound-normative framework the deeper we look. This framework
hinges on social and professional embeddedness, rhetorical practice
(particularly conversation), and authentic engagement of a community
of selves similarly situated.65 That, simply said, is discourse ethics.
IV.
I mentioned above that I see a connection between Jack's discursive
ethical position and another normative position (the one I'm not so sure
he will endorse). When I look at Jack's positions, his commitments to
inclusion and voice, his preoccupation with conversation and role, I see
an undeniable connection to what has been called "the ethics of care."6 6
The ethics of care was developed by feminist theorists like Carol
Gilligan,67 Nel Noddings,6" Virginia Held,69 and others near the end
of the last century in response to what was perceived as a devaluation
of certain social and discursive practices.7 ° These practices, such as
conversation, interconnectedness and intersubjectivity, role embeddedness, and so on, are either outright rejected or at least severely
denigrated by the major ethical theories (particularly deontological and
consequentialist theories).71

See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
63. Sammons, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation to Write Well, supra note 54.
62.

64. Id.
65.

Id.

66.

See JOSEPH P. DEMARCO, MORAL THEORY: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEw 111-15

(1996).

67. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993).
68. NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH To ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION

(1984).
69.

VIRGINIA HELD, THE ETHICS OF CARE: PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL

70. See NODDINGS, supra note 68; HELD, supra note 69.
71. HELD, supra note 69, at 58-64.

(2006).
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Advocates of an ethic of care suggest that the traditional concentration
on universal principles of justice and abstract moral reasoning miss the
importance of human interconnectedness and contextualized concern for
the situated needs of others.72 Nel Noddings explains this as follows:
"The source of my [moral] obligation is the value I place on the
relatedness of caring. This value itself arises as a product of actual
caring and being cared-for and my reflection on the goodness of these
concrete caring situations." 3 This is a shift on what counts as one
engages in moral deliberation. It's a move away from abstract moral
rules, virtues, and universal theories of right. As Joe DeMarco explains:
Care is a local phenomenon; it responds to the demands of a situation.
An ethics of care does not admit proper control of actions by rules or
universal principles. Yet care itself is universal. Natural caring is the
same in all places and all times, and becomes the base of universal
concern in ethical caring.74
It is not as though the ethics of care is relativist, then. Instead, rules
and customs are shifting and institutionalized.75 This is a sophisticated
form of ethical contextualism.7"
Under the ethics of care, how one acts morally depends on the role one
occupies and the circumstances occurring at the time of ethical decisionmaking.77 Those who advocate for this sort of moral reasoning maintain that the key component of ethics ought to be the focus on caring for
those who will be affected by the decision. The impact of any given
decision on all who will be affected (and not just the decisionmaker) is
a crucial aspect of the ethics of care. Further, advocates of an ethics of
care recognize the embeddedness of individual moral agents within a
community of other such agents. As Milton Mayeroff puts it:
The more deeply I understand the central role of caring in my own life,
the more I realize it to be central to the human condition. My world
becomes intelligible for me through caring and being cared for... In
the sense in which intelligibility means being at home in the world, we
are ultimately at home not through dominating or explaining or
appreciating things, but through caring and being cared for.7"

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

NODDINGS, supra note 68.
Id. at 84.
DEMARCO, supra note 66, at 114.
NODDINGS, supra note 68, at 46.
ROBERT L. HOLMES, BASIC MORAL PHILOSOPHY 219 (Peter Adams ed., 2d ed. 1998).
NODDINGS, supra note 68, at 46.
MILTON MAYEROFF, ON CARING 54 (Ruth Nanda Ashen ed., 1971).
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As such, an ethics of care is not just an altering of one's ethical
perspective. This view has both epistemological and metaphysical
aspects. The ethics of care can be seen as an ontological perspective,
then, one that implicates the way we exist in the world. 9 An ethics of
care requires all moral agents to practice consistency, courage, honesty,
hope, humility, nurturing, patience, and trust.8° They do so not only
because this is morally correct, but also because this is what gives life
meaning and how we understand that meaning.
When I look at Jack's body of scholarship, I see a close affinity
between his ethical commitments and the values resurrected and
advanced by the ethics of care. Throughout his work, Jack continually
comes back to the themes of moral deliberation in role, situated or
contextual judgment, and the social or communal impact of discourse.
All of these things are, or can be at least, directly related to the concerns
expressed and perspectives promoted by Carol Gilligan, Virginia Held,
Nell Noddings, Milton Mayeroff, and others. While Jack Sammons does
not relate his moral position to the ethics of care in any of his published
writings, I believe his ethical viewpoint can be easily dovetailed into
those authors who promote that theoretical position. Jack's discourse
ethics, like those of Apel and Habermas, alters the horizons of what
counts as ethical decision-making. When viewed through the lens of the
ethics of care, this expansion can gain important content and perspective.
The connection between discourse ethics and the ethics of care seems
obvious to me at one level, because theorists working in both of these
traditions are attempting to expand our conceptions of the ethical
realm."1 Discourse ethics and the ethics of care both want to develop
alternative accounts of what counts in moral reasoning.8 2 These
accounts are, admittedly, more complicated (and perhaps messier) than
To me that is attractive, as
traditional normative frameworks.'
human interactions are undeniably complicated and messy." The
robustness of Jack's discourse ethics goes a long way toward better

79. Sandra Garrison, The Impact of Being Moral: An Ontological Explanation of Care
Ethics (2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis), availableat http://scholarworks.sjsu.educgiview
content.cgi?article=3128&context=etd theses (last accessed Nov. 10, 2014).
80. HOLMES, supra note 76, at 202.
81. See APEL, supra note 20; NODDINGS, supra note 68.
82.

Id.

83. See, e.g., Fiona Robinson, Stop Talking and Listen: DiscourseEthics and Feminist
Care Ethics in InternationalPoliticalTheory, 38 MILLENNIUM J. INTL STUD. 845 (2011).
84.

Id.
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capturing these intricacies.' By adding the content of care ethics, the
concentration of Jack's work would be that much more textured. I would
love to see a dialogue between discourse ethicists like Jack Sammons
and those who promote an ethics of care.' This seems like a rich area
of possible collaboration and conversation; and that is what it's all about
isn't it?
V.
The unifying theme of Jack Sammons' scholarship is his concern about
the way discourse is carried out. His is a profoundly ethical perspective,
a perspective that seeks to enable constructive dialogue about legal,
political, and social controversies. As such, Jack's moral reasoning and
discourse allows new horizons of engagement by those who have
contested long-standing-and seemingly intractable-disputes.
His
concern about engagement and voice is exactly the sort of perspective
that other discourse theorists (like Apel and Habermas) attempt to
motivate. By continually reminding us that these acts of engagement
require, at base, ethical relationships with those we address, Jack
presents an explicit and robust discourse ethics.
Given that Jack has not presented his work in this way, one obvious
avenue of further scholarly exploration would be to assess his work to
tease out the elements of his ethical theory. I have tried to start that
process in some small manner here. I think this sort of examination
would be particularly fruitful if it was related to congenial ethical
paradigms like the ethics of care. I, for one, am energized about the
possibility of viewing the scholarly work of Jack Sammons through such
a lens. Having an opportunity to participate in this important Symposium has given me a renewed appreciation for Jack's scholarly work and
an excitement about where the ideas expressed in that work might lead
me in my own scholarly endeavors.

85. See, e.g., Sammons, Some Concluding Reflections, supra note 46; Sammons, The

Lawyer's Moral Obligation to Write Well, supra note 54.
86. There has been some work on this connection, but not nearly enough. See, e.g.,
Robinson, supra note 83.

